Sovereignty Support Movement Sovereignty for West Asia
Excerpts from Iran Unfiltered, published by NIAC, January 2, 2026
Editor’s note: In general these weekly “Iran Unfiltered” posts are very interesting, directly relate to immediate events in iran, but suffer on occasion to a measure o western bias. In this case I think the notes provide a particularly interesting view of the tensions and pressures caused by the criminal U.S. attempt to destroy the Iranian economy, beginning after the end of the Iran/Iraq war, and increasingly oppressive since early 2000s. Notice also that Trump and Netanyahu are deliberately making reckless remarks in an attempt to ratchet up the pressure.
Iran Protests Enter Sixth Day Amid Fatalities, Arrests, Economic Triggers, and Escalating Domestic and International Tensions
Protests in Iran have entered their sixth consecutive day, spreading across multiple provinces amid sharp currency volatility, economic pressure, and broader political discontent, while authorities report arrests, confirm fatalities, and warn against further unrest. According to compiled reports from local and international sources, at least eight people have been killed nationwide, though official accounts continue to dispute the causes and circumstances of several deaths.
The Lorestan provincial judiciary confirmed the arrest of a number of protesters in the cities of Azna and Delfan, without disclosing figures. Saeed Shahvari, head of the province’s judiciary, said prosecutors had been instructed to pursue “firm and decisive legal action” against those accused of disrupting public order. Iranian authorities asserted that protests in Azna escalated into violence, including an attack on a police facility, during which three people were killed and 17 injured, according to state media. The Fars News Agency claimed armed individuals attempted to seize weapons from the police station, though these accounts have not been independently verified. The Lorestan prosecutor’s office later warned that any participation in or calls for “illegal gatherings” would be met with decisive judicial action, framing public security as a judicial red line.
Funerals of those killed during the protests have become flashpoints for further tension. On January 2, the burial of Amirhossam Khodayarifard in Kuhdasht, Lorestan, took place under a heavy security presence. While state-aligned outlets initially described him as a Basij member, his family publicly rejected this claim. During the ceremony, his father said: “My son was not a Basiji. He did not riot.”
Similar disputes have emerged elsewhere. In Marvdasht, Fars Province, Khudadad Shirvani was killed during protests on January 1. A local member of parliament claimed he was killed by “thugs,” while videos circulating online show armed clashes and gunfire near Police Station 11. In Fooladshahr, Isfahan, Dariush Ansari Bakhtiarvand was killed; police attributed his death to a personal dispute, while reporting by international media indicates he was killed while participating in protests. Additional deaths have been reported in Azna (Lorestan) and Lordegan (Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari).
Videos published on Friday, January 2, show nighttime protests near Enghelab Square and Qarani Boulevard in Yasuj, the capital of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province. In the footage, gunfire can be heard, and security forces are seen using tear gas to disperse protesters. Demonstrators chant slogans including “Death to the dictator” and “This year is the year of blood; Seyed Ali will be overthrown.” The videos have not been independently verified.
Under the government of Masoud Pezeshkian, the exchange rate for imports of many non-essential goods was shifted from the first trading hall of Iran’s Currency Exchange Center, where the dollar stood at roughly 80,000 tomans, to the second hall, which is based on exporter supply and importer demand. Prices in this second hall have risen steadily, including an increase of around 2,000 tomans in a single day.
This move effectively eliminated a major profit margin for importers who had benefited from cheaper managed exchange rates. As a result, commercial hubs most exposed to the shift—Alaeddin Passage (mobile phones), Shadabad Iron Market, and Lalehzar (electrical goods)—became the starting points of protest. However, while currency policy appears to have sparked the initial demonstrations, the protests did not remain confined to these actors. As they spread, other social groups with broader economic and political grievances joined, and slogans and confrontations moved well beyond the original demands of affected merchants. What began as a sector-specific economic protest appears to have evolved into a broader expression of accumulated public anger, making the unrest less predictable and harder for authorities to contain.
At the same time, the Pezeshkian administration has publicly acknowledged the depth of economic problems inside the country, including public dissatisfaction and disagreement with government policies. Senior officials have stated that citizens have the right to protest peacefully, and, so far, security forces appear not to have escalated immediately to indiscriminate violence across the board to halt all protests. Available evidence suggests that the police have largely attempted to maintain control through crowd dispersal, arrests, and localized interventions in many locations. Still, fatalities, arrests and injuries have risen throughout the protests and could spike in the days to come.
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Inside Iran, videos indicate that some protesters have chanted slogans in support of Reza Pahlavi, the former Crown Prince of Iran and son of the last Shah, alongside broader anti-government chants. At the same time, many Iranian activists have criticized Pahlavi, pointing to his public support for Israel’s military attacks on Iran and his close relations with Israeli officials, arguing that endorsing foreign military action undermines domestic protest movements and alienates large segments of society. These disputes reflect deep divisions within the Iranian opposition.
While the current protest wave remains smaller in scale than major protest movements of recent decades, its economic origins, fatalities, disputed narratives, expanding social base, and internationalization underscore a volatile and evolving situation. It remains unclear whether the protests will expand, subside, or develop into a sustained movement, particularly if economic pressures persist and containment strategies are tested.
Trump Threatens Iran Intervention Amid Ongoing Protests
Early Friday morning, on the fifth day of the recent protest movement in Iran, President Trump posted on Truth Social threatening to intervene in Iran if protesters are killed. The post stated “If Iran shots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J.TRUMP.”
Notably, reports already indicate that several protesters have been killed amid the protests. However, it remains unclear how serious Trump’s message was as well as the form and trigger for any response. (and whether the protesters were actually killed by state actors [jb])
Iranian officials reacted harshly, pushing back and vowing direct consequences if the U.S. engages in military escalation. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, posted on X “With the statements by Israeli officials and @realDonaldTrump, what has been going on behind the scenes is now clear. We distinguish between the stance of the protesting shopkeepers and the actions of disruptive actors, and Trump should know that U.S. interference in this internal matter would mean destabilizing the entire region and destroying America’s interests.” Larijani concluded, “The American people should know — Trump started this adventurism. They should be mindful of their soldiers’ safety.”
Iranian officials reacted harshly, pushing back and vowing direct consequences if the U.S. engages in military escalation. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, posted on X “With the statements by Israeli officials and @realDonaldTrump, what has been going on behind the scenes is now clear. We distinguish between the stance of the protesting shopkeepers and the actions of disruptive actors, and Trump should know that U.S. interference in this internal matter would mean destabilizing the entire region and destroying America’s interests.” Larijani concluded, “The American people should know — Trump started this adventurism. They should be mindful of their soldiers’ safety.”
Separate Iranian officials struck a defiant tone. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the remarks as “irresponsible and dangerous,” rejected foreign interference, and said Iran’s armed forces are on alert. He distinguished between peaceful economic protests, which he described as legitimate, and isolated violent incidents, including attacks on police facilities. Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who has held many security positions, likewise vowed immediate consequences to American intervention. He stated “The Iranian people are well aware of the American “rescue” experience, from Iraq and Afghanistan to #Gaza. Any interfering hand that threatens #Iran’s security with flimsy excuses will encounter a resounding response and will be given even before it reaches its target. Iran’s national security is a red line, not a subject for reckless tweets.”
Iran’s parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, similar to Larijani and Araghchi, drew a distinction between what he framed as the grievances of legitimate protesters and those who might have violent aims. According to Ghalibaf, efforts to subvert the “legitimate protests of the bazaaris” and turn them violent were thwarted by government agents and the awareness of the nation. “The Iranian nation, throughout history, has disappointed enemies far more cunning than these; we never equate the ranks of the protesters with foreign mercenaries, and we embrace our dear children,” claimed Ghalibaf. “Moreover, the disrespectful President of America should also know that with this official admission, all American centers and forces across the entire region will be legitimate targets for us in response to any potential adventurism; Iranians have always been united and determined to act in the face of an aggressor enemy.”
The effort by Iranian officials to distinguish between “legitimate” protesters and those deemed intent on disruption or violence is notable, and appears to represent a subtle rhetorical shift from prior rounds of protest that were largely blamed on seditionists and foreign agents. Additionally, there does not appear to be evidence that the Iranian government has cut off or throttled internet access in the country, as occurred amid prior, major crackdowns. Whether such rhetoric and measures will persist and be reflected in Iran’s response to the protests moving forward remains unclear. Regardless, Trump’s warning has provoked harsh reactions from Iranian figures who were already on edge, and risks impacting the course of this nascent protest movement and the government’s response to it.
Third Day of Protests in Iran Shows Deep Public Anger but Uncertain Scale and Trajectory
Published December 31, 2025
On the third day of protests across Iran (December 30, 2025), demonstrations continued in Tehran and several other cities, marked by a convergence between bazaar-based protests and university student activism, even as the overall scale of unrest remained limited compared to major protest waves of recent years.
The current round of protests began on December 28, 2025, initially driven by economic grievances, particularly the sharp rise in the U.S. dollar and accelerating inflation, after the exchange rate briefly exceeded 144,000 tomans. Early demonstrations centered on shopkeepers and bazaar merchants, especially in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar and surrounding commercial districts. Within days, however, chants and slogans shifted from economic demands to overtly political messages, including “Death to the dictator,” “Freedom, freedom,” and direct criticism of the political system.
Throughout December 30, Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, 15 Khordad Street, Shoush Square, Shadabad market, Khayyam Street, and Aladdin Mall remained focal points of gatherings and intermittent strikes. Videos circulated showing arrests, a visible security presence, plainclothes forces, and the use of tear gas, including footage indicating the arrest of at least 11 protesters near Shoush Square. Protests also appeared in other cities, though mostly localized and short-lived.
A notable development on the third day was the entry of university students. Protests were reported at the University of Tehran, Amir Kabir University (Polytechnic), Shahid Beheshti University, Sharif University of Technology, Khajeh Nasir Toosi University, University of Isfahan, University of Yazd, and Allameh Tabataba’i University. Students chanted “Freedom, freedom,” “Death to the dictator,” and, in some confrontations with security forces, “Bi-sharaf, bi-sharaf” (“Shameless, shameless”). In a few cases—particularly at Shahid Beheshti University and Sharif University—reports indicated tensions and brief clashes between students and security or Basij forces.
Students at Allameh Tabataba’i University issued a public statement expressing solidarity with livelihood protests, emphasizing that economic hardship, political repression, and lack of participation are structurally linked, and warning that securitizing economic demands would only worsen the crisis.
The protests also affected journalists. Mehdi Beik, political editor of the reformist daily Etemad, was detained while covering bazaar protests near 15 Khordad Street and later released, with no official clarification regarding the reason for his detention or the detaining authority. His brief disappearance raised concerns about media pressure during the unrest.
Alongside security measures, authorities announced widespread closures. On December 30, 2025, schools, universities, government offices, banks, municipalities, and many commercial centers in Tehran were ordered closed, officially citing cold weather and energy shortages. Similar closures or remote-work arrangements were announced in most provinces, a move widely interpreted as an effort to limit gatherings and reduce protest momentum.
Official responses revealed a carefully calibrated approach. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani said the state “recognizes protests”, emphasized the constitutional right to peaceful assembly, and stated that President Masoud Pezeshkian had instructed the Interior Ministry to pursue dialogue with protesters. She acknowledged that public anger reflects severe economic pressure and announced a short-term economic stabilization plan intended to restore confidence over the coming months.
At the same time, security and military institutions adopted a more threatening tone. Senior police and IRGC officials warned against unrest, revived “sedition” and “fitna” narratives, and emphasized readiness to respond decisively. Mass SMS warnings, attributed to the IRGC Intelligence Organization, were reportedly sent to residents in Tehran, stating that attendance near “illegal gatherings” had been monitored and urging recipients to avoid further participation.
Most state and semi-official media outlets sought to frame the protests as narrowly economic and largely contained, portraying political slogans as the actions of small groups and repeatedly emphasizing a return to normalcy. This narrative contrasted with independent videos showing political chants, student participation, and confrontations with security forces, though the overall scale of demonstrations remained modest.
Statements from jailed political figures added to the political atmosphere. Abolfazl Ghadiani, writing from Evin Prison, openly called for the fall of the Islamic Republic, while Mostafa Tajzadeh linked the economic crisis to structural governance failures, calling for fundamental constitutional change.
By the end of the third day, it was evident that public anger and distrust toward the government were deep and widespread, cutting across economic, social, and political lines. At the same time, the scale of protests has so far remained limited, far smaller than the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement or earlier nationwide uprisings. The government has thus far appeared to contain the protests through targeted arrests, surveillance, closures, and rhetoric, while avoiding the level of violence seen in previous crackdowns.
As night fell across Iran, reports emerged of scattered protests in multiple cities, underscoring continued public anger over economic conditions while highlighting the limited and fragmented nature of the demonstrations on their fourth day. Images and videos circulated from Hamedan, Kouhdasht, Ganaveh, Dorud, Aligudarz, and parts of Isfahan, showing small gatherings, street protests, and ongoing strikes among shopkeepers and local merchants. In Tehran, reports indicated a heavy security presence, with no major public gatherings observed. Earlier in the day, footage from Fasa, in southern Fars province, showed one of the most intense confrontations so far, with protesters gathering outside the city’s special governorate building.
In Kouhdasht, Lorestan province, security forces reportedly used force to disperse protesters, with videos capturing the sound of repeated gunfire, though it remains unclear what type of ammunition was used. In Fasa, clashes escalated as protesters damaged the entrance and guard post of the governorate building, set a motorcycle on fire, and threw stones. Security forces responded with tear gas and shotgun fire. Iranian judicial and security officials denied reports of fatalities, confirming instead that four individuals were arrested and three police officers injured during the unrest.
State-affiliated media characterized the events as attacks on public property, while local officials and a parliamentary representative from Fasa claimed the protests were externally organized or directed, asserting that the situation had since returned to calm.
Against this backdrop, President Masoud Pezeshkian addressed growing political pressure during a ceremony marking the change of leadership at the Central Bank, warning that internal political disputes, alongside external pressures, were harming the country. In recent weeks, members of parliament have repeatedly criticized the government’s economic policies, ultimately prompting Pezeshkian to approve a change in the Central Bank’s leadership amid mounting unrest. Following the rejection of the draft budget’s general framework in parliament, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani announced that the administration would revise its proposal on salary increases for public employees and retirees, moving closer to lawmakers’ demands of 30 to 35 percent.
Government and judicial officials continued to advance a dual narrative: recognizing livelihood-based grievances while warning against escalation. Mohajerani reiterated that peaceful protest is a constitutional right and emphasized the government’s commitment to dialogue, while insisting the demonstrations remain economic rather than political—remarks that have drawn criticism from conservative outlets, including Kayhan. The Prosecutor General similarly described peaceful protests as understandable, while warning that property destruction or securitized unrest would face legal consequences.
Universities remained affected by both security and administrative measures. All detained students at the University of Tehran were released, according to a senior university official. Meanwhile, Allameh Tabataba’i University and Shahid Beheshti University moved classes online until the end of the term, officially citing weather conditions, energy shortages, and exam preparation needs.
It remains unclear whether the protests will continue, intensify, fade, or escalate beyond control. The situation is fluid, shaped by economic pressures, political signaling, and the balance the state seeks to maintain between containment and restraint. For now, the unrest reflects significant popular dissatisfaction, but not yet a unified or nationwide mobilization capable of overwhelming state control.
Trump and Netanyahu Escalate Warnings on Iran as Tehran Threatens “Severe, Immediate, and Unpredictable” Retaliation
Following a direct meeting held between President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in Mar-a-Lago, Florida, early this week, President Trump publicly escalated rhetoric against Iran, signaling that the United States would support—or directly carry out—military strikes if Iran moves to rebuild its missile program or resume nuclear activities. Responding to reporters at Mar-a-Lago, Trump said that “if they rebuild their missile program, yes,” the U.S. would back an attack, and “if they restart the nuclear program, immediately.” He added that he had heard Iran was attempting to “rebuild” damaged facilities, warning that if they are, in fact, doing so, “We’ll knock them down. We’ll knock the hell out of them,” but adding that “hopefully that’s not happening”
At the same time, Trump paired the threat with a diplomatic message, saying it would be “much smarter” for Iran to make a deal. He argued that Tehran could have agreed before a major strike in the past, adding, “I wish that deal had happened. I think they should make a deal.” Asked whether Washington supports regime change in Iran, Trump said he would not discuss overthrowing a government, but pointed to severe inflation, economic collapse, and widespread public dissatisfaction inside Iran. He also accused Iranian authorities of shooting protesters during demonstrations, saying he had witnessed “massive public discontent” for years. After the press exchange, Trump and Netanyahu began closed-door talks at the Mar-a-Lago estate.
Hours later, Iranian officials responded with sharp deterrence messaging. President Masoud Pezeshkian wrote on X that “the response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to any unjust aggression will be severe and regret-inducing.” Senior figures amplified the warning. Ali Shamkhani, a top adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, wrote in Hebrew that under Iran’s defense doctrine, some responses are determined even before threats are carried out, stressing that Iran’s missile and defensive capabilities are not subject to external control and warning that any aggression would face a “severe, immediate, and unpredictable” response. Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf echoed the stance, saying Iran does not seek permission to defend itself and that any response to “adventurism and aggression” would be broad, uncompromising, and potentially unexpected.
International reactions followed quickly. Moscow urged restraint, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warning against steps that could escalate regional tensions and emphasizing that dialogue with Iran is necessary.
The exchange comes amid renewed focus in Israeli media on Iran’s missile program, including reports alleging efforts to rebuild missile capabilities damaged in earlier strikes. During the 12-day Israel–Iran war, Israeli operations prioritized nuclear facilities and figures linked to Iran’s military programs, while also striking research centers, laboratories, workshops, missile launchers, and entrances to missile storage sites. At the time, analysis centered on disabling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but attention has since shifted toward the missile dimension, now prominent in U.S. and Israeli warnings.
Taken together, the episode reflects a familiar and volatile pattern: U.S.–Israeli military threats coupled with calls for a deal, met by Iranian deterrence messaging and warnings of unpredictable retaliation, as external actors urge restraint. Whether Trump’s posture is intended primarily as leverage for negotiations or signals readiness for renewed military action remains unclear, but the rhetoric has raised regional tensions and increased the margin for miscalculation.
Iran Faces Converging Economic and Political Crises as Currency Collapse Fuels Protests
Published December 29, 2025
Iran is experiencing a converging economic, political, and security crisis marked by record-breaking currency depreciation, sharp price volatility, and expanding street protests, particularly among shopkeepers and market traders. What began as localized economic protests has rapidly evolved into broader unrest, unfolding alongside austere budgeting, institutional deadlock between the government and parliament, renewed international sanctions, and unusually stark wartime rhetoric from senior officials.
On Sunday, December 28, large numbers of shopkeepers and citizens gathered in Tehran, particularly along Republic Street, around Aladdin Mobile Mall, and in Shoush Iron Market, chanting protest slogans and calling on other merchants to join them. Videos circulating on social media show widespread store closures or semi-closures, especially inside Aladdin Mall and in parts of the Grand Bazaar, including Saray-e Ahan-garan and Cheragh Bargh. Protesters were heard chanting “Don’t be afraid, we are all together,” and some marched from inside Aladdin Mall toward Hafez Bridge at the intersection of Republic and Hafez streets.
As of this week, demonstrations expanded geographically and intensified greatly, with protests reported in Saadi Street, Istanbul Square, and other parts of Tehran. Video evidence suggested larger turnout and broader dispersion than on the first day. At the same time, similar protests emerged outside the capital, including in Qeshm Island, where shopkeepers in Dargahan closed their businesses and chanted anti-government slogans, underscoring the national dimension of the unrest. The cities of Kerman and Hamadan also saw protests.
These protests coincided with extreme turbulence in Iran’s currency and gold markets. During Sunday’s trading, the U.S. dollar surged beyond 144,000 tomans, the euro exceeded 169,000 tomans, and the British pound reached approximately 194,000 tomans. The Emami gold coin climbed to 169 million tomans, marking an increase of more than 10 million tomans in a single day, while one gram of gold approached 6 million tomans. Although prices eased slightly later in the day, the rapid and repeated spikes triggered panic among traders, leading many merchants and currency dealers to suspend transactions altogether. Numerous official exchange offices reportedly closed, some posting notices stating that no currency trading would take place.
As protests continued into a second day, security forces intervened. Videos documented police and anti-riot units deploying tear gas to disperse demonstrators near Aladdin Mall, Hafez Bridge, and Bagh-e Sepahsalar. Footage showed blocked streets, burning trash bins, and a heavy riot police presence. Protest slogans increasingly went beyond economic grievances, including explicit political chants and direct criticism of security forces, reflecting growing politicization of the unrest.
Against this backdrop, Masoud Pezeshkian delivered unusually stark remarks in a rare interview published on a website affiliated with Ali Khamenei. Pezeshkian described Iran as being engaged in a “full-scale war” with the United States, Israel, and Europe, characterizing it as more complex and damaging than the eight-year Iran–Iraq war. He argued that Iran is now under economic, financial, political, and psychological siege, rather than facing a conventional battlefield.
Pezeshkian explicitly linked current economic hardship to the return of international sanctions following the activation of the UN snapback mechanism by Britain, France, and Germany, as well as to declining oil revenues, stating that Iran’s oil price has fallen from roughly $75 to $50 per barrel, reducing national income by $25 per barrel. He also pointed to disruptions caused by the recent 12-day war with Israel, which he said reduced production and services. Despite these pressures, the president announced plans to convert approximately $2.5 billion into domestic currency before Norooz to finance voucher-based subsidies (kalabarg) for targeted populations.
These remarks coincide with the government’s proposed 1405 budget, widely viewed by analysts as austerity-oriented. The draft budget includes a projected 70 percent reduction in revenues from oil sales, bond issuance, and oil-for-product barter arrangements, alongside a proposed 20 percent wage increase for public sector employees—less than half of the official inflation rate, which exceeded 42 percent according to Iran’s Statistics Center. Pezeshkian acknowledged deep “imbalances” across key sectors, including energy, water, public finance, and governance, while stating that revenue from fuel price adjustments would be redistributed through vouchers rather than used to cover deficits.
Iran’s parliament rejected the overall framework of the budget. Mojtaba Yousefi, spokesperson for the Joint Budget Committee, cited inflationary risks, unrealistic revenue assumptions, and declining purchasing power. However, parliamentary criticism revealed a central contradiction: lawmakers warn that insufficient revenues could force borrowing and fuel inflation, while simultaneously demanding higher wages, pensions, and increased spending in areas such as development and defense—without identifying credible new revenue sources. In a parliamentary session, Pezeshkian openly challenged MPs, asking where the money should come from, and warning against reliance on “illusory revenues and unavoidable costs.” Past experience suggests that parliament has often resolved such tensions by expanding expenditures while inserting unrealistic revenue projections, deferring fiscal consequences to later in the year.
Amid the currency turmoil and protests, the government also signaled a shift in monetary leadership. Mehdi Tabatabaei, deputy for communications at the presidency, announced that by presidential decision Abdolnasser Hemmati will become Governor of the Central Bank of Iran. While state media have not formally confirmed the departure of Mohammad Reza Farzin, semi-official outlets widely report his removal. Hemmati previously served as central bank governor under the Rouhani administration and was recently impeached and removed as economy minister, underscoring deep political divisions over economic management.
Taken together, these developments point to a compound crisis in which currency collapse, austerity budgeting, renewed sanctions, and wartime framing reinforce one another. The persistence and geographic spread of protests—combined with security force intervention and institutional deadlock—highlight deep domestic vulnerabilities, including eroding purchasing power, collapsing market confidence, and unresolved contradictions in economic governance. Absent credible revenue planning, coherent monetary–fiscal coordination, and tangible protection for household incomes, economic shocks are likely to remain a powerful trigger for further unrest in the months ahead.
