Iran’s Strategic Decision to Restore Deterrence & Prevent Continued Military Pressure

from The Conflict Forum, January 28, 2026

A compilation tracking consequential observations & strategic developments on Iran-US-Israel

It would appear that Iran’s insistence on sovereignty has thrown a little wrench in the works of the Trump-Netanyahu war machine.

• Iran rejects US & Israeli messages on a ‘symbolic attack-symbolic response’ /
• ‘Iran-US dispute has passed stage of negotiation & compromise; Its fate will be determined by war’ /
• Seyed Hossein Mousavian: ‘Trump must rethink ‘surrender-driven strategy’ /
• Israeli Report: CENTCOM Commander met senior IDF officials (25 Jan): ‘No date for an attack on Iran’ /
• Ben Caspit: ‘Israel still hoping for a US attack; Netanyahu has staked all his political capital on such a move’ /
• Meir Ben Shabbat: ‘Israel must do everything to ensure US not tempted to enter negotiations with Iranian regime’

CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS & STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS —

Iran redefines Rules of Engagement & Red Lines — Strategic Decision to Restore Deterrence and Prevent Continued Military Pressure (Mostafa Najafi, Iranian analyst):

‘Iran has reached a definitive decision based on two considerations to respond immediately and comprehensively to any U.S. attack, regardless of its level and scope. First, such an attack is assessed as an existential threat from Tehran’s perspective … As a result, the perception of the threat to the Islamic Republic from U.S. military action has gone beyond the level of a ‘manageable incident’ and has been elevated to the level of an existential threat. Second, the country’s military authorities seem to have concluded that U.S. attacks — even if limited — will not lead to the end of the cycle of conflict and … will continue the ‘looming shadow of war’ and increase the economic and political security costs … Accordingly, a comprehensive response to any attack, with the acceptance of all its consequences, is considered a solution to restore deterrence and prevent the continuation of military pressure.’

‘Iran-US dispute has passed stage of negotiation & compromise; Its fate will be determined by war’ (Mostafa Najafi):

America has set 4 preconditions that make any compromise impossible: 1. Complete shutdown of the nuclear program and delivery of all 3.67%, 20%, and 60% enriched materials, 2. Restrictions on the range and number of ballistic missiles, 3. Commitment to not arming and supporting resistance groups, 4. Recognition of Israel! The Iran-America dispute has passed the stage of negotiation and compromise, and its fate will be determined by war.

Iran rejects US & Israeli messages on a ‘symbolic attack/symbolic response’ (Mostafa Najafi):

In the past two weeks, two important messages were conveyed to Iran, both of which were rejected … One came from the US and the other from Israel. The message from Washington was: “We will carry out a limited attack and you should accept it / or at least give only a symbolic response.”Tehran, while rejecting this request, announced that it has redefined its rules of engagement and red lines, and will consider any attack as the beginning of a full-scale war. Israel’s message, delivered through one of the mediators, was: “We will not participate in the American attack,” and Iran was asked not to target Israel. This [too] was met with a negative response from Iran, and it was explicitly stated that as soon as the US launches military action, Israel will be attacked

At the same time, Iran sent a message to all countries in the region, from Baku to Riyadh, stating that any attack launched from the territory or airspace of these countries will result in an attack on those countries themselves. The main reason for the cancellation of the U.S. military strike on the night of Tuesday [13 Jan] was exactly this. That is why the operation was postponed — so that by deploying a massive volume of offensive and defensive military equipment to the region, three objectives could be pursued: deterrence, containment of Iran’s response, and preparation for the escalation scenario.

Is a Naval Blockade of Iran on the Horizon? (Mostafa Najafi):

One plausible scenario … is a gradual move toward a naval blockade of Iran … with the primary goal of exerting maximum pressure without immediately escalating to all-out war … However, envisioning [such a scenario] without security repercussions or an Iranian response is hardly realistic … The key point [being] that the naval blockade is viewed not necessarily as a prelude to an immediate strike, but rather as a tool for economic attrition, restricting government financial resources, and amplifying internal pressures … Amid this, Israel’s role as an escalatory variable is significant. Israeli security assessments indicate that if U.S. actions remain limited and symbolic, a direct Iranian response against Israel is not guaranteed; however, if Tehran concludes that the ultimate goal of these pressures is regime change, the likelihood of expanding the scope of conflict and targeting Israel as a reciprocal pressure lever will rise … In summary, the scenario of a naval blockade of Iran … appears to have a considerable chance of materializing; a scenario aimed at reducing Iran’s oil export capacity, fostering internal erosion, raising Tehran’s strategic costs, and ultimately achieving a military defeat for Iran while dragging the Islamic Republic to the negotiating table under new conditions.

What they’re saying: Deputy Commander of IRGC Navy: ‘We have complete control over the sky, surface, and underwater domains of the Straits of Hormuz’:

Iran receives real-time intelligence from the air, the surface, and beneath the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, and the security of this strategic passage is entirely dependent on Tehran’s decisions. Iran is not seeking war, but it is fully prepared for it. If war is imposed, there will not be even a millimeter of retreat … The management of the Strait of Hormuz has gone beyond traditional methods and is now fully intelligent and integrated. Iran maintains continuous and comprehensive monitoring of all maritime, surface, and subsurface movements. The decision to allow or deny the passage of vessels of any flag lies completely in Iran’s hands. Neighboring countries are considered friends; however, if their land, airspace, or territorial waters are used against Iran, they will be treated as hostile. This message has already been clearly conveyed to regional parties. Iran does not want harm to the global economy, but it is also unacceptable for the Americans and their supporters to benefit from a war they themselves initiate. Beyond [this], there are additional capabilities that will be revealed at the appropriate time.

What they’re saying: ‘Iran cannot accept a frozen conflict or symbolic strikes’:

A long-term strategy of exhaustion, containment, and gradual erosion … appears to be part of a Trump scenario, where a massive war machine is being assembled around Iran to impose that same formula: pressure without resolution, escalation without closure. Iran understands this pattern very well … [which is] why Iran cannot accept a frozen conflict, symbolic strikes, or performative ceasefires that only buy time for the enemy to regroup. Iran seems to have decided to strike US and Israeli interests in a far more decisive and painful way—enough to alter calculations, disrupt timelines, and shatter the pre-designed theater of war itself. The goal is not reaction, but deterrence through disruption: breaking the script entirely rather than playing a role written by Washington and Tel Aviv.

For Iran, another US–Israeli attack would be an ‘existential war’ (Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Eye):

Iran is facing a crisis unlike any it has seen in decades … navigating a perilous landscape with profound regional and global implications … [In Dec] 2025 … economic grievances had ignited a new wave of protests, as merchants in Tehran took to the streets to decry the rial’s collapse and soaring living costs. The unrest quickly spread to other cities. This environment created an opportunity for the US and Israel to deploy Plan B [– a] strategy [of] “bottom-up uprising, top-down military assault” … But the US-Israeli strategy to hijack the protests ultimately failed … The next potential phase of the US-Israeli strategy may involve an attempt to remove Iran’s top leader … President Pezeshkian has warned against such a move, vowing that “an attack on the great leader of our country is tantamount to a full-scale war with the Iranian nation” … US-based pro-Israel hawks have suggested that rather than launching a full-scale invasion, Trump should revive a 1979 proposal by Admiral James “Ace” Lyons, which calls for seizing Iran’s Kharg oil terminal – responsible for roughly 90 percent of its oil exports – as a way to economically cripple the country and potentially force regime change.

Several factors will shape Iran’s trajectory in the days and months ahead. The first is domestic governance and social cohesion … While the government has regained control for the time being, simmering dissatisfaction could reignite large-scale protests … The people of Iran cannot withstand the escalating trend of rising prices and inflation … The second factor is the US-Israeli drive for regime change … Trump’s overt calls for regime change … mark a historic escalation in decades of bilateral relations … It remains to be seen whether Trump will enter into negotiations with Iran for a mutually satisfactory, face-saving deal … or whether he will continue the “surrender or war” approach. Third … [and] crucially, US-aligned Arab states … have opposed military intervention … amid fears of regional escalation and Netanyahu’s vision of an ever-expanding “Greater Israel” … Fourth [–] Iran has strengthened ties with Russia and China … [an] alignment [that] seeks to provide Tehran with military, economic and political support against western destabilisation efforts … This will serve as a critical test of Iran’s “pivot to the East” policy, with far-reaching implications for the future of the region. Last but not least, several of Iran’s key regional allies … have publicly warned that they would enter a wider conflict if the US or Israel attacks Iran …

Some American and European experts told me that Trump has made his decision to carry out a new attack on Iran … For Iran, a next US–Israeli attack would be an “existential war”, eliminating any incentive for restraint and unleashing a conflict that would be impossible to control. If catastrophe is to be avoided, Trump must rethink a “surrender-driven strategy” and move toward a “broad, face-saving deal” with Iran – ending 47 years of confrontation before the region is pushed into irreversible war.

The Danger of “Syrianization” for Iran (Mostafa Najafi):

The catastrophic unrest of Dec [2025-Jan 2026] cannot be dismissed merely as another wave of protest in Iran’s calendar of crises. What transpired was more than a transient event; it was a sign of the country entering a new phase of accumulated tensions—a phase that, in terms of scope, intensity, and consequences, has transformed it into [an] alarming incident … If we view these violent disturbances as [part] of a larger scenario —the danger of “Syrianization”—then we are no longer dealing with a scattered set of unrests, but rather an escalating trend; a trend built on four main pillars.

The first pillar is the temporal continuity of discontent … Dec [2025] reveals that these unrests are not impulsive reactions to a specific decision or incident, but successive eruptions of an unresolved structural dissatisfaction … [signs of] compressed rage and anticipation; as if each wave accumulates the unanswered demands of the previous one and carries them forward to the next stage … The second pillar is the shift in the quality and quantity of protest actions. Protest has gradually moved beyond limited, local, or sectoral frameworks to become a more radical form of action … [with] a noticeable increase in the number of active protesters [and] a corresponding escalation in violence. Past periods served as warnings and indicators of eroding trust in official channels for problem-solving. In this context, violence is not necessarily the goal; rather, it is the product of the absence of lower-cost avenues for protest and a sense of the ineffectiveness of reform mechanisms.

The third pillar is the overlap of social fault lines—the point at which protests turn from demands into crises. Rifts that previously activated separately—economic, identity-based, political, or lifestyle-related—have now interconnected. This linkage means that a limited spark can draw in a broader array of groups, dramatically expanding the scope of social mobilization. The result is unrest that is not only more widespread but also more complex and uncontrollable; as evidenced by disturbances observed in over 300 cities across the country.

The fourth pillar is the growing appeal of foreign intervention in such a context. When the persistence of protests, the radicalization of actions, and the overlap of fault lines occur simultaneously, the crisis transcends a purely domestic issue. For external actors, this situation becomes a lower-cost, higher-yield opportunity—whether through media and political channels, economic pressure, or even scenarios involving military strikes. In such an environment, foreign agents do not remain passive but enter the fray more decisively, organized, and directly …

Thus, as internal cohesion erodes and the government-society divide deepens, the capacity for external narratives, direct support, and targeted pressures to take effect increases. Multi-fault-line protests, in particular, are highly susceptible to external steering; for each fault line can become a conduit for infiltration and crisis escalation. In this reading, the real danger lies not in a few days of unrest, but in the persistence of the very trend that produces these events. If the cycle of unresolved discontent, escalating violence, and fault-line interconnections continues without an effective solution, isolated incidents will evolve into recurring patterns and then into larger crises. From this perspective, Dec [2025] is not an exception but a tangible warning: a situation that may still be containable, yet one that starkly reveals the serious erosion of political and social capacities. The [recent] unrest demonstrates that the cost of “not changing” is rising rapidly. The core issue is no longer whether reforms are easy or difficult; the issue is that the alternative will be more complex and uncontrollable crises.

Summary of the meeting between CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper and senior IDF officials, 25 January 2026 (Hallel Bitton Rosen, Israeli Channel 14’s Military and Security Correspondent):

No date for an attack on Iran

The Americans will need time to build up significant force

That said, prepared for an immediate strike if necessary

The Americans want a clean, swift, and inexpensive operation

The objective – focus on those who harmed civilians and protesters

Ready to replace the regime in Iran.

Hallel Bitton Rosen (UPDATE — 27 Jan):

In recent days, the United States conveyed a message to Israel regarding their preparations for a strike in Iran, stating that the preparations for the attack have not yet been completed and that the window of opportunity for it could also be several months ahead. At the same time, and in the very same breath, the Americans added that this does not mean they are waiting for the preparations to be completed, and that from their perspective a strike could also take place before then — of course, provided that President Trump orders it — although this possibility does not appear to be on the table at the moment.

Could Israel accept a deal? — ‘Israel still hoping for a US attack; Netanyahu has staked all his political capital on such a move’ (Ben Caspit, leading Israeli commentator):

The uncertainty over a US strike on Iran has prompted regret in some quarters in Israel over the decision to urge Trump to postpone an imminent attack two weeks ago … Nonetheless, while Israel regrets that the strike did not happen, it understands the decision. The planned timing — on the night of Jan. 14 — appears to have been ill-advised both operationally and defensively. “The Americans had not yet amassed sufficient forces here, they did not have a coherent plan and a well-defined goal,” a senior Israeli diplomatic source conceded … “but at the moment it seems that although the Iranian regime is at a record low, it is not on the verge of collapse,” he added.

Netanyahu joined Saudi, Qatari and Turkish leaders in pressing Trump to postpone the attack … the NYTimes reported … Among the reasons cited for urging a delay were concern that the attack would be too weak and premature, given the insufficient military deployment in the region [and] Israel’s need to complete its preparations in case of a retaliatory Iranian missile barrage … Israel’s missile-interceptor arsenal still needs supplementation, and coordination is required for the complex task of mobilizing regional interception systems to help deflect Iranian retaliation …

Trump’s shifting messages generated rapid assessments in Israel that a US strike could occur within a day, several days or never … Israel is preparing for two possibilities as the situation unfolds: an American attack or Iran’s acceptance of a deal with Washington curbing its nuclear program … Israeli security sources have since assessed that the White House could seek a more effective nuclear deal than the one reached by the Obama administration just over a decade ago. A deal would seem sure to benefit Netanyahu … Still, what Israel considers a good deal may differ from what the US sees as acceptable. For years, Netanyahu has called for an agreement that would dismantle Iran’s nuclear program entirely … From Israel’s perspective, settling for a nuclear deal rather than pursuing regime change could be seen as a missed historic opportunity.

Some Israeli politicians and senior leaders in Israel’s security apparatus are growing disillusioned with the idea of bringing down the Iranian leadership. “Negotiations … from an American position of power and Iranian historical weakness, would not be a bad thing,” said another top Israeli diplomat … But this remains a minority view in Israel, especially following recent threats by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, warning that a US attack on Iran would ignite fires throughout the region. These threats contradict initial Israeli assessments that Hezbollah would seek to avoid fighting while recovering from blows inflicted by Israel’s military over the past two years … Israel is still hoping for an American attack, according to political sources … Netanyahu, the sources say, has staked all his political capital on such a move, betting that Trump will not pull back at the last minute and will instead deliver a decisive blow to Iran.

‘Israel must do everything in its power to ensure US not tempted to enter negotiations with Iranian regime’ (Meir Ben Shabbat, former Netanyahu National Security Adviser):

As speculation swirls over the likelihood of a strike against Iran and regional tensions reach a boiling point, Trump continues to keep everyone guessing … On Wednesday, he voiced hope that no further military steps would be taken against Iran. In the same breath, he stressed that the US would act if Tehran resumed advancing its nuclear program … The implication is that as long as the current situation in Iran holds, military action would be taken only if it renews its nuclear activity … Has Trump returned to the path of accommodation and abandoned the idea of regime change? That too is unclear … Still, public and diplomatic discourse in recent days has cast doubt on the feasibility of achieving regime change quickly, as Trump would prefer. Instead, assessments point to a prolonged interim period of chaos. These assessments, together with the relative lull in protests inside Iran, may have curbed ambitions in the White House, at least for now.

What, then, is the purpose of the US military buildup and deployment in the region? First and foremost, readiness for a range of possible scenarios… Second[ly] preparedness for the next opportunity. Given Iran’s persistent structural problems, the assumption is that a renewal of protests is only a matter of time. Moreover, the deployment itself could help encourage such unrest … Third, the forces are meant to deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program …

From Israel’s perspective, developments regarding Iran largely reflect a positive trend. Tehran is mired in diplomatic, military and economic distress. Its allies and proxies are unable to come to its rescue. The “maximum pressure” campaign and secondary sanctions are taking their toll … [But]Israel cannot afford to stand aside and let events run their course. It must do everything in its power to ensure that the US is not tempted to enter negotiations with the Iranian regime. The mere existence of political dialogue would provide the regime with a lifeline vis-à-vis its protesting citizens, signaling the possibility of agreements that could ease conditions. Political negotiations would seriously undermine the prospects for regime change precisely at a moment when that possibility is becoming tangible …