The Strategic Struggle for Gulf Leadership as Abraham Accords Fracture

from the Conflicts Forum, February 10, 2026

Bitter, zero-sum Saudi-UAE confrontation for Gulf leadership /

“Saudi media war takes darker turn aiming to fracture the UAE from within” /

Saudi Twitter commentators: ‘How Epstein Became an Advisor to MbS’ /

WaPo: ‘Saudi Arabia-UAE epic feud matters for Trump’s plans to transform the region’ /

‘A vast new energy corridor’: After expelling UAE, Saudi Arabia carves up South Yemen /

US & Israel are forcing capitulation (’normalisation’) on Lebanon

LOGO

STRATEGIC DEVLOPMENTS & CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS:

Saudi-UAE all-out confrontation for Gulf leadership (Mawadda Iskandar, The Cradle):

The [MbS and MbZ] are locked in a zero-sum contest for regional primacy … There were signs of growing tensions back in December 2022 when MbS, speaking to Saudi journalists, reportedly vowed to retaliate against the UAE for undermining the kingdom: “It will be worse than what I did with Qatar,” he is quoted as saying … On 26 January, [Saudi] FM bin Farhan, declared that “[on] Yemen, there is a difference of view. The UAE has now decided to leave Yemen.” It gave the impression of a prerequisite for repairing relations … Riyadh’s media machine sprang into action. Articles and TV reports accused the UAE of betrayal, destabilization, and acting as Israel’s Trojan horse. Prominent Saudi commentators denounced Abu Dhabi’s regional schemes. Social media accounts linked to the royal court launched coordinated attacks, and leaks exposed Emirati involvement in sabotage, espionage, and sectarian manipulation … The gloves were off …

The [Saudi] media war took a darker turn with Saudi campaigns aiming to fracture the UAE from within. Saudi-aligned commentators began amplifying messages on social media that contrasted Abu Dhabi’s policies with Sharjah’s more traditionalist stance. One prominent Saudi figure publicly praised the leadership of Sharjah’s ruler, Sultan al-Qasimi, for adhering to Arab-Islamic constants and resisting westernization – an implicit rebuke to MbZ’s path. Tuwaijri’s article, titled ‘The UAE is in our hearts,’ published on the website of Saudi newspaper Al-Jazirah … launched a scathing attack on Abu Dhabi’s leadership, accusing it of acting as a Trojan Horse for Israeli ambitions: “It goes without saying that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has absolutely no problem with the United Arab Emirates. It’s one and only problem is with Abu Dhabi – specifically with those whose hatred, jealousy, and envy have blinded them, and who have willingly become a dagger in the side of the Arab nation, a foolish mount ridden by Zionism to achieve its ambitions in the region and across the broader Arab world” …

In response, Emirati commentator Jasim al-Juraid penned a scathing counter-article titled ‘When the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] cry in the name of patriotism’ … “This article is not out of jealousy for the Kingdom,” Juraid wrote, “but a political lamentation for the project of political Islam that was trampled by the new Emirati-Saudi modernization train.” He dismissed the base claims as a “pathetic attempt to demonize a declared and clear strategic alliance,” adding that the Emirates was acting “bravely and in broad daylight.” Adhwan al-Ahmari, editor-in-chief of Independent Arabia, also weighed in on the dispute. “Saudi Arabia served as Abu Dhabi’s political and media engine over the past few years, believing it had aligned with an honest partner,” he wrote. “But since 2018, it became clear that Abu Dhabi was scheming and conspiring. Riyadh waited … But patience ran out. The kingdom pulled its cover – and what lay beneath was weakness, exposed and emaciated” … Suleiman al-Aqili, former editor-in-chief of several Saudi newspapers, said that “the UAE has betrayed the strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and has become a provocateur of crises within the Saudi strategic field” … Ali al-Shehabi, a member of NEOM’s advisory board, stressed that “Emirati ambition is not the problem in itself, but the method used,” considering that Saudi Arabia is the geographical barrier between instability and the UAE.

Leaks pointed to US and Gulf pressures on MbZ to cede power, with proposals floated to reinstall Mohammed bin Rashid as the UAE’s federal president. Saudi Arabia, for now, appears to be using this card as leverage – a threat, not yet a strategy. Dr Fouad Ibrahim tells The Cradle that Saudi Arabia understands the risks of exploiting Emirati internal disputes: “It is the most dangerous card because it can internationalize the crisis and expose the entire Gulf system, including Saudi Arabia, to instability … As for the issue of ‘overthrowing bin Zayed,’ it is an analytical exaggeration. MbS is not seeking to overthrow his rule, but rather is working to reduce his regional influence and transform it from a ‘leading partner’ to a ‘secondary actor,’ with the aim of readjusting the balance of power in the Gulf in Riyadh’s favor” …

Riyadh has unleashed a torrent of exposés aimed at delegitimizing the UAE. One theme paints Abu Dhabi as Israel’s top Gulf partner: providing bases, sharing intelligence, and enabling surveillance in Yemen, Eritrea, and Somalia. Leaked documents revealed that Emirati authorities had naturalized Shin Bet operatives and sabotaged shared military installations. Saudi sources have accused the UAE of systematically undermining Yemen’s air capabilities since 2015 … [through] sabotage and control … Saudi Arabia’s regional counter-offensive is coordinated and expansive. In Yemen, it has unified allied forces under Saudi command, sidelining UAE-backed factions … Even the GCC has become a battlefield, with Riyadh leveraging its weight to isolate the UAE diplomatically … Informed Yemeni political sources tell The Cradle that Riyadh has begun practical steps to isolate Abu Dhabi from the Gulf, represented by an open attack by the assistant secretary-general of the GCC on the UAE’s policies in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia, in parallel with the aborting of MbZ’s official visits to Bahrain and Kuwait …

According to Dr Ibrahim, MbS’s break with Abu Dhabi is not an emotional reaction, but a calculated strategy to reposition the kingdom as the Gulf’s sole center of gravity. Riyadh is pursuing four parallel tracks: economically, by diverting capital and investment flows from Dubai to the Saudi capital; politically, by redefining the GCC and co-opting Oman and Kuwait to reduce Emirati influence; militarily, by opening direct channels with actors like Iran, Syria, and the Ansarallah-led government in Yemen, bypassing UAE-linked intermediaries; and symbolically, by framing Saudi Arabia as a ‘big state’ leader, in contrast to what it portrays as Abu Dhabi’s ‘small functional state’ model.

If the military and political showdown remains largely covert, the economic war is out in the open. Saudi Arabia has begun a quiet but devastating capital flight from the UAE – with $26.6 billion pulled out, representing a major share of Emirati foreign investment … Trade flows are also slowing. Multinational firms are hedging their bets, fearing Riyadh will squeeze the UAE out of Gulf commerce … Abu Dhabi cannot match Riyadh punch-for-punch. Its strategic depth is narrow, and its economy is exposed. Crucially, its power depends on external protection. So it turns to familiar tools: lobbying, media, and litigation. Leaks suggest Emirati officials have contracted western law firms to threaten legal action against Saudi Arabia, aiming to deter firms from abandoning the UAE …

But the battlefield has shifted. Israel … has retreated into the comfort of Emirati normalization. Washington wants to keep both actors in balance, but increasingly sees Saudi Arabia as the indispensable power and the UAE as the disciplined subcontractor … [Mohammed al-Numani, a professor of political science at Aden University and a member of the Political Bureau of the Southern Revolutionary Movement] expects an escalation of Emirati-Israeli actions targeting both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. He notes that Abu Dhabi has reactivated its alliance with Israel as a security guarantee, demonstrated by its presence on Yemeni islands and coordination over strategic maritime routes … [and] concludes that the conflict is likely to persist, as it centers not on temporary tactical disputes but on control of southern Yemen, vital sea lanes, and regional power balances …

Riyadh is driving a wedge into the very foundation of Gulf unity, reshaping alliances and power structures with calculated ambition. MbS has bet that Riyadh can dominate the region alone – without a junior partner in Abu Dhabi. Whether that gamble pays off depends on how far he is willing to go, and whether MbZ can survive the storm gathering at his gates.

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Epstein & MbS: Saudi Twitter commentators on recent leaks (People’sVisionSA, Twitter — re-posted by the infamous Saudi tweeter, Mujtahidd)

How Epstein Became an Advisor to MbS, Saudi Crown Prince (Part One) (Yousef Al-Awsi, Twitter):

Summary from 60 Documents Recently Released by the US Department of Justice: In the fall of 2016, Epstein faced a fateful choice. Two of the world’s wealthiest royal families were vying for his attention. On one side was Sheikh Hamad of Qatar [and] the other was Mohammed bin Salman, the ambitious 31-year-old Saudi Crown Prince, who was consolidating his grip on power … Epstein chose Mohammed bin Salman. It was a calculated gamble. And it would pay off in some way …

The Intermediary: Terje Rødlarsen: … The Saudi route would prove the most valuable for Epstein, and he began it with a Norwegian diplomat. Terje Rødlarsen was no ordinary man. He is a former UN coordinator for the Middle East peace process, the architect of the Oslo Accords, and the founder of the International Peace Institute. He moved within the highest diplomatic circles. He was also, as documents reveal, a friend of Epstein … Rodlarson was the bridge that opened the door to the Saudi Royal Court!

[In] May 19, 2016 … the real action began: a dinner at Epstein’s home attended by: Terry Rod-Larsen / Intermediary, UN Diplomat; Lawrence Summers / Former US Treasury Secretary; Katherine Rummler / Former White House Counsel under Obama; Tom Pritzker / Billionaire, Chairman of Hyatt Hotels Corporation, CSIS Board Member; Raafat Sabbagh / Newly Appointed Royal Court Advisor. In one evening, Epstein introduced the new Saudi Royal Court advisor to the elite of the American establishment. A former Treasury Secretary. A former White House advisor. A billionaire with intelligence ties. This was Epstein’s value proposition incarnate: “Access” …

By July 2016, the structure of the relationship between the Crown Prince and Epstein was clear … Throughout late summer 2016, correspondence reveals Epstein’s handling of sensitive Saudi matters … These were no casual consultations. Epstein was advising on matters concerning Saudi national security, Saudi sovereign legal exposure, and the Saudi economy, which was about to host the world’s largest planned IPO! …

MbS tasked Epstein with reviewing the “proposed economic development zone in Vision 2030” … [and] designated specific ministers to coordinate with. The Crown Prince asked Epstein to draw up a comprehensive plan for the country … [Epstein requested] detailed organizational information on three key Saudi institutions: The Public Investment Fund (PIF); the Economic Development Board; the Saudi Central Bank. For each, he wanted: the organizational structure, the top 30 employees, five strategic objectives, five implementation steps for each objective, and five key problems. This wasn’t casual curiosity. It was gathering strategic intelligence on the institutions that would lead Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation …

Then came the gift, and a series of revealing messages began … When Mohammed bin Salman rose from Deputy Crown Prince to Crown Prince on June 21, 2017, Epstein’s phone lit up. He received two messages that day from two different centers of power: Robert Cohn (a television host with ties to the Chinese president) texted: “Your photo with Mohammed bin Salman has become more valuable.” Epstein replied: “Yes.” Ehud Barak, the former Israeli prime minister, sent his own message: “Great promotion for Mohammed bin Salman” … the former Israeli leader acknowledges Mohammed bin Salman’s rise and, implicitly, the value of Epstein’s relationship with him … Epstein had backed Mohammed bin Salman when he was merely deputy crown prince. Seven months later, Mohammed bin Salman bypassed his cousin, Mohammed bin Nayef, to become the apparent heir apparent. Epstein’s early positioning paid off. End of Part 1.

Saudi Arabia-UAE epic feud matters for Trump’s plans to transform the region (David Ignatius, Washington Post):

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates … should be rejoicing together these days. Iran is weak, its proxies are on the run, and an American armada approaches the Persian Gulf. But instead they have stumbled into an epic feud that could polarize the region … [The] Saudis have attacked the UAE as “Israel’s Trojan horse” and denounced the Abraham Accords, joined by the UAE in 2020, as “a political military alliance dressed in the garb of religion”.

Emirati officials believe the Saudis are waging a deliberate incitement campaign centered on the UAE’s relationship with Israel … A second social media analysis by Orbis Operations, a national security consulting firm, found that social media influencers had falsely sought to link a UAE leader with sex offender Jeffrey Epstein … The [Trump] administration is said to have offered to mediate, but both sides have balked, according to several knowledgeable officials. Because of the intense personal feelings, one official told me, “This is not something you mediate.”

The dispute matters because Trump has placed big bets on both countries as he seeks to transform the Middle East. Trump needs unified gulf support as he threatens military action against Iran, tries to disarm Hamas in Gaza, and seeks to help expand Israel’s ties with the fragile nations of Syria and Lebanon …

Ali Shihabi, an MBS adviser, posted commentary Jan. 1 that expressed Saudi frustration — and deepened UAE anger: He described a “structural imbalance” in the gulf between a big Saudi Arabia and smaller rivals. “As these smaller states acquire great wealth, they often begin to operate under the illusion that they are equal partners of the Kingdom.” Shihabi’s dismissive tone angered Emiratis …

The tit-for-tat continues. Emirati officials believe that Saudi Arabia urged friendly Muslim countries, including Kazakhstan, Syria and Jordan, to stay away from the World Governments Summit held last week in Dubai. The UAE launched the summit in 2013 as a regional forum … Family feuds come and go in the Middle East, as around the world. What concerns me about this quarrel is the growing attacks on the UAE because of its opening to Israel … In its seeming encouragement of vitriolic Saudi attacks on the UAE as a “Devil of the Arabs” that takes orders from Israel, the kingdom is playing with fire.

Abraham Accords on brink of collapse as UAE loses patience with Netanyahu (Israel Hayom, pro-Netanyahu Israeli daily):

If the Abraham Accords ever stood on the edge of collapse, it happened on September 9, 2025. That day, Israeli Air Force jets bombed a building in Doha, Qatar’s capital, where Hamas leaders had gathered. The shockwaves from the historic strike reverberated clearly 310 miles (500 kilometers) away in Abu Dhabi, the UAE capital. They violently shook the walls of President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed’s palace. “He very much disliked the fact that Israel rampages with its aircraft wherever it wants,” said an Israeli official, a senior defense figure until recently, who maintains close ties with Abu Dhabi’s political leadership and has met personally with bin Zayed … Following the Israeli strike, the furious bin Zayed convened an emergency meeting to discuss the UAE’s response options … one option raised at the table was a dramatic decision to freeze the accords … The option to freeze the Abraham Accords did come up at that Abu Dhabi meeting, but ultimately came off the table. Still, on the Emirates’ scale – skilled statesmen who usually conduct themselves in a measured and moderate manner – their response to the Doha attack was wild. “A crude and cowardly move, a reckless and aggressive act,” bin Zayed described the strike in an official statement issued by the Emirati foreign ministry that same day …

The most significant diplomatic step bin Zayed took was his decision to fly the day after the Doha strike for a solidarity visit to Qatar. For bin Zayed … the Qatar visit was a glaring message to Israel that enough is enough …

An Israel Hayom investigation, based on conversations with figures in Israel and the Emirates, reveals that for a long time, the palace in Abu Dhabi has felt deep frustration and disappointment with Jerusalem, questioning the benefit they gain from the Abraham Accords. Behind this stand a series of failed economic deals, an ambassador who evokes negative emotions, extremist statements by government ministers, unclear Israeli policy regarding Gaza’s future and Judea and Samaria – and no small amount of suspicion toward Netanyahu. The Emiratis themselves, in keeping with their diplomatic character, will not openly admit their displeasure with Israel, but their patience appears to be running out …

From the Emirates’ perspective, cooperation with Israel has exacted a heavy price. From the moment the Abraham Accords were exposed, many of their Muslim brethren have perceived them as assisting Israel in its struggle against Palestinians and Arabs. “They call us traitors,” an Emirati official frankly admits … “The Abraham Accords put the Emirates on the radar of the Iranians and other Muslim countries. For them, it was a move with many risks,” said a senior figure in the cyber industry who has worked with the Emirates for many years. “But when I ask the Emiratis what they gained from the Abraham Accords, their answer is ‘a 450% growth in terror attack warnings’ … On the other hand, economically and politically, they are not receiving everything they can from Israel. They are in a mode where they are also being driven out of town and eating the rotten fish” …

The word “trust” keeps recurring in the many conversations we have had in recent weeks about Israeli-UAE relations. Usually, it is associated with the name “Netanyahu.” Paradoxically, it seems the one struggling to gain the Emirates’ trust is precisely the man who signed the Abraham Accords with them. One of the clearest signs of this is that, more than five years after signing the accords, Netanyahu has not been invited for an official visit to the Emirates …”Recently, I sat with one of the emirs’ sons, who told me, ‘I do not understand – your ministers talk about erasing Gaza and taking over the Temple Mount. Is this really the Israeli position?’” an Israeli official said. “The Emiratis are by their definition a peace-pursuing people, truly neutral. They went with Israel into an alliance of moderates, and suddenly they find Israel as a psychotic player in the Middle East. This stresses them very much.”

‘A vast new energy corridor’: After expelling the UAE, Saudi Arabia carves up Yemeni territory (Mawadda Iaskander, The Cradle):

Riyadh [is] tighten[ing] its grip on Yemen’s southeast through land grabs, oil theft, and the erasure of contested borderlands … Riyadh is no longer sharing control with Abu Dhabi. Now, it wants the whole cake – under the pretext of restoring order and eliminating chaos. [Last week] Saudi Arabia’s cabinet approved a memorandum of geological cooperation with Yemen. While framed in neutral, bureaucratic language, the move signals a new phase of resource control. Geology is the gateway to oil, gas, and rare minerals. Whoever draws the maps holds tomorrow’s economy. The impact was immediate. In [the border zone] Al-Kharkheer … clashes broke out. Shortly after, the area vanished from Google Maps in an apparent digital prelude to territorial annexation … Riyadh [is] deepen[ing] its presence, imposing administrative and military orders in strategic locations … bringing in loyal forces, and pushing into Hadhramaut … The Saudi-backed formations began displacing any unit not aligned with their agenda … The most consequential development came when Saudi Arabia reportedly asked Google to erase the Yemeni border villages of Al-Kharkheer from digital maps. The request coincided with new military deployments. Activists saw it as preparation for a land grab. They warned that the move aimed to erase a strategic oil-rich village in the Hadhramaut Valley. Some urged legal action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Riyadh and its proxy government in Yemen of colluding to steal land …

A local activist tells The Cradle the recent clashes are part of a longer pattern. He says Riyadh … [aims] to fragment communities and cloak its oil grab in tribal infighting: “Riyadh is not satisfied with what it previously captured in Al-Kharkheer, Al-Wadiah, Sharura, and Al-Shaybah, but is now expanding towards Hadhramaut, Shabwa, and Al-Mahra, using misleading political slogans such as the outcomes of dialogue and autonomy to redraw the southern geography in a way that serves its expansionist ambitions and aborts the right of southerners to their independent state.” He adds that British maps confirm Al-Kharkheer and nearby territories belong to the Sultanate of Al-Kathiri and Hadhramaut, framing Riyadh’s project as a long-standing colonial-style expansion.

Saudi’s pipeline plan: Since the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has sought to run an oil pipeline through Yemen’s east to the Arabian Sea. Initial attempts failed. But the 2015 war revived the idea, especially as the Strait of Hormuz became vulnerable … The new plan extends from Al-Kharkheer to Nishtun Port, and reflects Riyadh’s quest to compete with Emirati influence, and to benefit from the lower cost of a direct pipeline route linking the oil fields in the east of the Kingdom to the Arabian Sea. Geological reports suggest huge oil reserves from Al-Kharkheer to Thamud. The late former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh began drilling in 2000, but Riyadh halted the work by offering to fund the Yemeni army. It then began offering compensation and citizenship to evacuate residents … Now, with the pipeline project extending from Al-Kharkheer to the Arabian Sea, Riyadh is laying the foundation for a vast energy corridor that cuts through more than two-thirds of Yemen’s eastern territory. The route grants Riyadh unprecedented leverage over mineral-rich lands and strategic chokepoints – tools to redraw the region’s map of power and influence.

Gulf unity cracks: Report — Saudi begins military withdrawal from Bahrain (Hasan Qamber, The Cradle):

The intensified rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has started to echo through Manama’s political halls, threatening to redefine Bahrain’s loyalties, dependencies, and internal stability. Saudi–Emirati rivalry has migrated inward, converging on the smallest GCC state and exposing the early contours of a more fragmented Gulf future … Riyadh’s presence in Bahrain [since 2011 has] functioned as both a deterrent and a guardian, particularly during periods of internal volatility. But more than a decade on, there are signs that this arrangement is shifting. Reports of the early stages of a Saudi military withdrawal from Bahrain – if confirmed – reflects a deliberate political recalibration. Riyadh is drawing new lines for what it expects in return for its security backing. Citing “secret sources,” the Dark Box reveals that: “The decision to pull out troops … came after a breakdown in coordination and trust, driven by what Saudi officials perceived as a Bahraini alignment with Emirati positions that run counter to Saudi interests.”

LOGO

US & Israel forcing capitulation (’normalisation’) on Lebanon —

With focus on Iran and Ukraine, the US continues to steer the unchecked and aggressive Israeli hegemonic push into Lebanon, thereby cancelling Israel’s ceasefire obligations, overriding UN Resolution 1701 and working to remove and replace the UN entirely. From opposite political camps, leading Lebanese commentators Michael Young (Carnegie Middle East Centre) and Ibrahim Al-Amine (Editor, Al-Akhbar) warn of coerced ‘normalisation’ (capitulation) by the US & Israel on Lebanon, and of the ‘Ukrainianisation’ of Lebanon:

By Forcing Normalisation on Beirut, Israel Could Turn Lebanon into Another Ukraine (Michael Young, Substack):

The ceasefire that ended the Hezbollah-Israel conflict in November 2024 gave new life to what is known as the Mechanism, expanding it to a five-party military committee to discuss implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The body includes the US, as chair, Lebanon, Israel, France and the UN. There are signs today, however, that the US and Israel are seeking to drop the Mechanism, or replace it with a three-party format from which France and the UN would be excluded. Their apparent aim is to initiate bilateral contacts between the Lebanese and Israelis, mediated by the Americans, to reach a peace agreement… Moving to a three-party format poses major risks for Lebanon. First, transcending the Mechanism could implicitly render Israel’s obligations under the ceasefire agreement more or less void. Israel has already largely failed to implement the ceasefire agreement’s conditions anyway, as it continues to bomb Lebanon almost daily. The deadline for an Israeli withdrawal in January last year was ignored, as was a subsequent deadline. However, for Lebanon to formalise this by accepting a new negotiating format would only compound their problem.

Second, Lebanon is hardly capable of standing up alone to the US and Israel if they collude in a trilateral format to compel Lebanon to sign on to the Abraham Accords … The third risk of a three-party format is that it would allow the US and Israel to push the Lebanese beyond where they are willing to go today. The Lebanese position on the Mechanism is that it is a forum for negotiations to implement the ceasefire and delineate the land border with Israel – the first step in agreeing mutual security guarantees. This is the maximum of what Beirut is willing to do today, at least officially. However, the question is whether Lebanon would be able to set limits on the scope of negotiations with Israel if the Israelis and Americans demanded more. The latter two have leverage to do just that. Israel occupies areas of southern Lebanon and may impose conditions on Beirut before agreeing to withdraw from these territories – while continuing to bomb Lebanon … Internally, there is little broad support for a peace agreement with Israel, so that any measures perceived as leading in that direction could provoke domestic tensions, as certain groups or communities mobilise against them. Externally, a Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement could mean that Lebanon finds itself in Israel’s sphere of influence. It is unlikely that other regional powers, especially Turkey, which has significant influence in Syria, would welcome or allow such a development on Syria’s borders. But the Turks are not alone. In a region where major powers are competing to prevent the hegemony of rivals, especially Israel, Lebanon could turn into an arena for regional competition.

US & Israel seek to impose ‘normalisation’-capitulation on Lebanon (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar):

Israel [has] presented [Lebanon] with a list of conditions, coordinated with Washington whose severity left little room for maneuver … [I]t became clear that the negotiation framework bore no relation to Resolution 1701, the cessation of hostilities, or reviving the armistice. What was underway was a political negotiation to produce a special security arrangement in its first phase, followed by political steps culminating in a declaration of peace between Lebanon and Israel.

Israel’s conditions: First: Israel will not cease military operations anywhere in Lebanon until Hezbollah is fully disarmed nationwide, its military wing dissolved, and this process verified through specific mechanisms. Second: Israel rejects the Lebanese army’s declaration that it has completed its mission south of the Litani. It demands the right to inspect any house anywhere in Lebanon to ensure the absence of weapons deemed threatening to Israeli security … Third: Withdrawal from the five occupied points will not be considered before Lebanon formally ends its state of hostility with Israel and signs a new security agreement that supersedes both the Armistice Agreement and Resolution 1701, which Israel now considers obsolete. The international force [UNIFIL] currently deployed, Israel added, will leave Lebanon before the end of the year.

Fourth: Reconstruction of border areas must take place within a framework agreed upon with Israel. Lebanon, Israel argues, has no right to rebuild in ways that disregard Israeli “security concerns” … Fifth: The return of residents to frontline villages must exclude anyone affiliated to Hezbollah or any organization Israel deems threatening. Full return, as demanded by Lebanon, is therefore rejected. Instead, Israel promotes an “economic zone” model that would transform the border area into a site for large-scale tourism and investment projects [with] new security arrangements. Sixth: Any discussion of future relations must immediately move to a higher political level. The current technical framework is deemed unnecessary, with Israel insisting on exclusive US participation in talks … explicitly excluding France, the UN, or any other international party. Israel has meanwhile refused to engage substantively on the prisoner file …

A secret meeting in Florida: [Lebanese Ambassador] Karam … informed both the President and PM Salam that further maneuvering was pointless, and that the only remaining path was direct political negotiations … US Ambassador Michel Issa … informed [the President] that … neither Tom Barrack nor Morgan Ortagus retained any role. The message was clear: the existing framework was no longer binding. Aoun later acknowledged that Washington had suggested moving the talks to US Central Command headquarters in Tampa, a step he understood would sideline France and effectively remove the UN from the process. Under pressure, he sought regional mediation, including through Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan, before announcing that he had rejected relocating the talks and asked instead for the “Mechanism” to be revived. The Americans agreed — though not without extracting a further concession … [which] took the form of a quiet military move … in Tampa, Florida … the first direct military meeting of its kind between a Lebanese army officer and an Israeli officer, conducted in secret under US supervision … Lebanon received [from the US] a promise to resume committee meetings between February and May, and a blunt clarification from a US embassy security official in Awkar: the Lebanese, he said, did not understand that their issue is not a priority. The US military leadership is focused on a single file — Iran — and has no time to spare for Lebanon.