Sovereignty Support Movement Sovereignty for West Asia
from The Conflicts Forum, Substack, March 12, 2026
Alistair Crooke and his wife follow Israeli and Arab news sources very closely to share a comprehensive picture of news in the region)
Ibrahim Al-Amine: How to Read Hezbollah’s Return to the Battlefield /
Marwa Osman: Lebanese Army Commander Rudolph Haykal defiant; Refuses to confront Hizbullah or instigate internal conflict /
Yezid Sayyigh: Israel’s Plan in Lebanon? To impose unconditional surrender on Hezbollah and uproot the party /
Michael Young: Evacuated population; Extended security zone — Objectives ‘reminiscent of what Israel did in Gaza’ /
Gadi Eisenkot (former IDF Chief of Staff): ‘Northern Israel paralyzed under Hezbollah’s infernal fire; Complete dismantling of Hizbullah must be implemented’ /
Yossi Melman: ‘Hezbollah’s strength surprised Israeli intelligence’
CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS & STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS:
How to Read Hezbollah’s Return to the Battlefield (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar):
The return of the resistance to the battlefield this swiftly was not … simply an act of solidarity with Iran. For Hezbollah, the conflict has entered an existential phase, and direct confrontation has become the only way to change the balance of power on the ground. Understanding this moment requires examining what happened inside Hezbollah since the war [ended in] November 2024. The war was costly. Israel assassinated key figures in the party’s political and military leadership. Yet after absorbing the shock, the organization adopted a deliberate strategy of ambiguity that came to govern its daily operations … The military wing gradually withdrew from view and moved almost entirely underground. Informal channels that had existed for two decades, through which journalists could gain some insight into the resistance’s activities, were effectively shut down … The leadership refused to respond to pressure from supporters who interpreted the silence as weakness. The last war exposed how deeply Israeli intelligence had penetrated Hezbollah’s internal structure through technology, human sources, and accumulated experience. Yet Israeli officials are now expressing growing concern about the limits of their current knowledge …
On the Lebanese political front, senior officials appear to rely largely on the US–Israeli narrative of the regional war … [Many] assumed Hezbollah would remain passive. Their calculation was to freeze the question of the party’s weapons until Iran falls, after which, resolving the issue would become straightforward. Events unfolded differently; Hezbollah chose to open fire. The Lebanese army, for its part, has made clear it will not be drawn into an internal confrontation.
Senior security sources say the army leadership has long warned American and Saudi interlocutors that forcing the military to confront the resistance would lead directly to civil war. A coordinated campaign, however, has emerged against the army leadership. The “defenders of sovereignty” have launched attacks on the army commander, demanding his dismissal, as well as other security chiefs, because they refused to implement the government’s decision to dissolve the party’s military wing. Washington quickly supported the pressure … A new [LAF] leadership would be expected to deploy the army against Hezbollah, suppress its supporters by force, and arrest figures linked to the resistance … [Some] have gone further, discussing dissolving the party and issuing arrest warrants against … Sheikh Naim Qassem … Until recently, the country appeared close to a dangerous escalation. But according to the latest reports, Lebanese officials say the immediate crisis has been contained. A basic consensus has emerged that no state changes its army commander in the middle of a war, and the political leadership will not take steps that would lead to civil conflict.
Hizbullah launches operation to impose border security zone inside Israel/Occupied Palestine (Al-Akhbar):
The confrontation between the Islamic Resistance and the Zionist forces reached a turning point yesterday with Hezbollah announcing the launch of Operation Devoured Straw (Al-Asf Al-Maakoul). The tactical strikes aimed to force settlers across the northern region of occupied Palestine to evacuate their settlements under heavy rocket fire, with more than 100 rockets launched within a short period. Suicide drones also targeted Israeli army positions and command-and-control centers, creating confusion within the [Israeli] military and political leadership … Reports indicated that Israeli intelligence underestimated Hezbollah’s capabilities, with Radwan Force units maintaining positions south of the Litani River and accessing weapons caches containing anti-tank missiles, mortars, and rockets despite months of Israeli bombardment.
Israeli officials and media began calling for an expansion of the war to include Lebanese infrastructure and a large-scale ground invasion. In addition, discussions among mediators warned that facilities in the country could be targeted if the Lebanese army did not act against Hezbollah. Israeli media also reported that Tel Aviv may even seek US assistance in its war against the Islamic Resistance … [Israeli] Military analyst Avi Issacharoff said Hezbollah “is in a better position than we thought and there are no signs of collapse” …
The occupation’s response was familiar. Whenever Israel faces pressure on the battlefield or struggles to contain the resistance, it often widens its target range against civilian areas in an attempt to restore deterrence and pressure the resistance beyond the frontline … reflecting a strategy that echoes the occupation’s genocidal conduct in Gaza, where densely populated neighborhoods and areas hosting forcefully displaced civilians have repeatedly been targeted during moments of military strain …
‘Northern Israel paralyzed under Hezbollah’s infernal fire; Dahiyya Doctrine & complete dismantling of Hizbullah must be implemented’ (Gadi Eisenkot, Israeli General and former IDF Chief of Staff):
Northern Israel is abandoned and paralyzed under Hezbollah’s infernal fire, just a year after a war that came at a heavy price and ended with PR … This is another failure that must not be tolerated under any circumstances! The Dahiyya Doctrine has never been more relevant than now and it must be implemented. The hundreds of rockets that the residents of the north have been absorbing for 12 days are a resounding reminder to the Israeli government that this campaign must not end without the complete dismantling and demobilization of the terrorist organization – and it must give the IDF full freedom of action for this purpose. Any outcome that leaves Hezbollah functioning in Lebanon will be a serious and intolerable blow to the security of the country’s citizens and to national resilience, for generations. This strategic opportunity must not be missed.
‘Hezbollah’s strength surprised Israeli intelligence’ (Yossi Melman, intelligence & strategic affairs correspondent for Haaretz, 7th Eye Magazine):
Hezbollah’s ability to operate at its current strength is a big surprise that surprised Israeli intelligence. Less than a year and a half ago, the defense establishment boasted that they had dealt a particularly hard blow to [Hizbullah], cutting off its military leadership and neutralizing its command and control structures. Furthermore, after the assassination of Nasrallah … the IDF, the Mossad, the political echelons, and the studios belittled … Naim Qassem, saying he was weak and lacking military knowledge and leadership skills. Apparently, they were wrong again … But why should we once again believe the military and political leadership that exudes confidence and spreads promises of victory? Once again, they are not ashamed to put this word on their lips. They promised a “complete victory” in Gaza but Hamas is still standing on its feet. They promised a victory over Hezbollah and announced that it had been achieved, but Hezbollah is within range of Tel Aviv. They promised a “victory for generations” over Iran in the previous campaign, but here we are again in the shelters. Israel is, once again, caught in a war of attrition on two fronts … At most, it will be able to emerge … with the feeling that it has succeeded in severely damaging Iran and Hezbollah again, until the next round … We will get a policy of rounds against Iran and Hezbollah. Only this time the entire country will be in range of fire. To call this a victory is a mockery …
Commander of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Rudolph Haykal defiant; Refuses for LAF to ignite to confront Hizbullah or be used in internal conflict (Marwa Osman):
A serious political and institutional confrontation appears to be unfolding within the state structure of Lebanon, following reports that the Commander of the [Army], Rudolph Haykal, has refused to allow the military to be drawn into an internal confrontation. According to circulating statements attributed to Haykal, the army will not participate in any move that could ignite internal conflict or fracture Lebanese society. The position is widely interpreted as a rejection of pressure from the current political leadership to confront Hezbollah domestically … Political sources claim that external actors, particularly the US, had already begun discussing three potential replacements for Haykal should he refuse to comply with demands to escalate internally.
If these reports are accurate, Lebanon may be entering a rare and extremely dangerous constitutional moment, where the chain of command between the political leadership and the military leadership becomes contested. Haykal’s refusal effectively signals that the army leadership believes any internal military confrontation would risk national collapse, particularly at a time when the country faces continued threats from the Israeli military across the southern frontier … [and] armed terrorist groups along the eastern frontier in Syria … Opening a domestic military front under such conditions would risk simultaneous internal and external destabilization.
Under the Lebanese constitutional framework, the army is formally subordinate to the civilian government, specifically the Council of Ministers. The Commander of the Army does not possess independent political authority to challenge the government. Any military intervention in politics, including a coup, would technically be unconstitutional. However, Lebanon’s political reality has historically been more complex. The army has often acted as a stabilizing institution rather than a purely political instrument, particularly when the political class itself is deeply divided or externally influenced.
If Haykal continues to resist political orders that could spark internal conflict, several scenarios could unfold:
Scenario 1: Institutional compromise: The most stable outcome would be a political climbdown by the government, quietly shelving the idea of confrontation with Hezbollah and allowing the army to maintain its neutral posture. In this case, Haykal remains in command, the army preserves national unity and political actors avoid pushing the state toward collapse.
Scenario 2: Attempted dismissal of the army commander: If the government attempts to remove Haykal and appoint a more compliant figure, the situation becomes significantly more dangerous. Possible consequences include: Resistance within the officer corps; Refusal by parts of the army to recognize a new commander; A crisis of legitimacy within the military institution.
Scenario 3: Military intervention: The most extreme possibility would be a preemptive move by sections of the army leadership to prevent what they see as national destabilization. Historically, militaries in fragile states have justified such moves as necessary to preserve national unity and prevent civil war. However, such an outcome would immediately trigger a constitutional crisis, international pressure and internal political confrontation.
The most dangerous outcome would be … a split inside the Lebanese Armed Forces themselves. If rival political factions begin pulling officers and units in different directions, the country could face a scenario where two military chains of command emerge, units align with opposing political forces and the army fractures along sectarian or political lines. That situation would echo the early stages of the Lebanese civil war, when the national army disintegrated and multiple armed forces emerged. The deeper issue here would be political legitimacy. What makes the current tension particularly volatile is the perception among many Lebanese that parts of the political class are aligning themselves more closely with foreign agendas than with national stability … No army can remain cohesive if it is ordered to prioritize political rivalries over national security.
Lebanon appears to be standing at a critical institutional crossroads. Either political leaders step back from escalating internal confrontation, preserving the army as a unified national institution, or continued pressure could trigger a dangerous chain reaction inside the military establishment itself … For now, the position taken by Commander Rudolph Haykal appears to be a clear signal: The Army does not want to be the spark that ignites another Lebanese internal war. Whether the political leadership listens, or attempts to force the issue, will determine how dangerous the coming weeks may become.
Israel’s Plan in Lebanon? To impose unconditional surrender on Hezbollah and uproot the party (Yezid Sayigh, Carnegie Middle East Centre):
Israel is repeating parts of the military playbook it used against Hezbollah in 2024, but … the context is drastically different this time around, thanks to the full-throated engagement of the administration of President Trump in a war to destroy Iran’s principal strategic capabilities … Trump might diverge from Netanyahu in preferring to see a more compliant regime emerge in Iran than a completely new one, but Netanyahu is going all-out for regime collapse. Everything in Israel’s military campaign against Iran points to this goal …
There is absolutely no reason to expect Israel’s goals in Lebanon to be any less ambitious and far-reaching. A great deal more than the disarmament of Hezbollah is on the Israeli agenda. The widespread assumption that Israel intends to impose a formal peace treaty on Lebanon is plausible, but this may not be its foremost goal. Rather than seek the restriction of Hezbollah’s activities “to the political sphere” … a more plausible interpretation of Israel’s principal goal is to engineer Hezbollah’s complete outlawing and dissolution. Historical analogies should never be taken too far, but one that comes to mind is the Japanese surrender in World War II. The country had not been fully defeated on the battlefield when the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; indeed, some Japanese officers believed the army retained enough strength to negotiate “peace with honor” … It seems likely that Israel wants something similar with Hezbollah to what the Americans sought with Japan: unconditional surrender.
Consequently, Israel seeks more than simply to compel the Lebanese government to move beyond declaratory policy to actively implement its ban on Hezbollah’s weapons. The government’s ability to comply is in question … However, the radical shifts in both the regional strategic context and the domestic political balance in Lebanon offer Israel a unique opportunity to ram through its objectives in full. That said, Israel cannot ensure the full disarmament of Hezbollah, or its political suppression, alone … no matter how efficiently lethal Israel’s firepower is, it cannot complete the job without occupying major tracts of Lebanon beyond the south … A complementing Lebanese effort is necessary, hence the effort to force the Lebanese government’s hand one way or the other …
The orders to evacuate entire swathes of south Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut, along with threats to create a deep buffer zone along the common border and the intimation that Israel will carpet bomb Hezbollah’s southern suburbs stronghold, all serve this purpose … Any ground incursion could harden into a long-term presence, for example, not as a prelude to annexation as some believe, but more likely to reap further gains in the form of a peace treaty and normalization with Lebanon. But Israel’s ratcheting up of military pressure necessarily has a political purpose first and foremost: to drive the political isolation of Hezbollah, and crucially its social undermining, as a prelude to its uprooting among the Shiite community, and even its own core constituency.
Hezbollah’s preemptive strike signals the battlefield will shape next phase of the regional balance (Tamjid Kobaissy, The Cradle):
Hezbollah has succeeded in restoring a significant portion of its operational capacity after a period of reorganization and rebuilding. The scale and speed of that recovery appear to have surprised the Israeli military itself, which now seems uncertain in its assessments and strategic choices. The battlefield in the south has not unfolded according to Israeli expectations. Hezbollah fighters have appeared at the forward edge of the front line, operating in direct contact zones with Israeli forces … demonstrating their operational readiness, striking advancing tanks with precision and targeting military vehicles alongside positions held by Israeli soldiers inside Lebanese territory. At the same time, Hezbollah has continued striking military sites deep inside occupied territory, a clear indication that its missile capabilities remain intact and capable of imposing new deterrence equations on the battlefield.
The repercussions of these developments have not remained confined to the military arena … the situation has rapidly spilled into the political sphere. A fierce debate erupted after the government announced a decision to “ban Hezbollah’s military activity” and classify its military and security operations as “outside the law” … a move that effectively aligns with Israeli objectives by placing political pressure on the resistance. More importantly, the decision carries potentially serious implications for Lebanon’s fragile internal balance … Available information indicates that the Lebanese army has no intention of entering into direct confrontation with Hezbollah. Such a step could fracture the army itself, something senior officers understand all too well, regardless of the personal positions of the army commander …
Hezbollah had already detected signs that Israel was preparing a larger military move: [Hezbollah official and former Lebanese minister Mahmoud Qamati said] — “The information that reached us, field monitoring along the border, and the announcement of the enemy army’s military mobilization all clearly showed that it was no longer satisfied with the daily aggression that has continued for 15 months. It was preparing to surprise Lebanon with a new invasion and occupation. We therefore carried out a preemptive strike that thwarted the element of surprise. Instead, we surprised them and resumed resistance after our patience had run out” … The timing of Hezbollah’s attack effectively disrupted those deliberations. Even Israel’s own defense minister indirectly acknowledged this sequence. “We decided to carry out a preemptive strike against Hezbollah, but it preceded us by attacking Israel,” he said …
These developments suggest that Lebanon is entering a new phase of confrontation rather than experiencing a short-lived military escalation. Hezbollah has once again emerged as a central regional actor capable of shaping the pace and direction of the conflict … By entering the battle directly and imposing new battlefield equations, Hezbollah has effectively secured a seat – whether formally acknowledged or not – at the negotiating table that will define the region’s next phase.
Evacuated population; Extended security zone — Objectives ‘reminiscent of what Israel did in Gaza’ (Michael Young, The National):
Last week, the Israelis … ordered all inhabitants of southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River, to leave and move northwards … dramatic developments are reminiscent of what the Israelis did in Gaza. There, they imposed major population movements to enhance their control over certain areas and create bargaining chips that could help Israel secure both military and political benefits. Yet with Hezbollah, the Israeli aims may be even more ambitious … By emptying the southern suburbs, the Israelis may have sought to uproot Hezbollah by breaking its links with this largely self-governed entity, fragmenting and dislocating the community that formed Hezbollah’s base, and denying it an environment in which to thrive. Beyond that, the move allows Israel to play with the demographic balance in the capital. What it does may determine when, by whom, even if, the suburbs will again be inhabited … if Israel levels the southern suburbs –… Smotrich claimed the area would soon look like Khan Younis in Gaza –- this could be seen as a way of rupturing the Shiite presence in Beirut, therefore the political influence accompanying this …
What other objectives would Israel like to achieve in Lebanon? … By evacuating the population south of the Litani, [including] Tyre, the Israelis have created a free-fire zone that, for now, it will be able to take and hold. In this way, they will have the latitude to use it as leverage in shaping the aftermath of the border area, which will include political conditions. By pushing most Lebanese out of the area south of the Litani, the Israelis are also indirectly putting themselves in a position to redefine the adjacent area north, between the Litani and the Awali River …
There has been much speculation about what the Israelis intend for the regions south of the Litani … former US Envoy Tom Barrack had proposed that the border area be turned into an economic zone … [aimed at] provid[ing] an incentive for inhabitants of the south to co-operate with Israel … Assuming such a project is adopted, a more pertinent question is how this area would be managed, and how it might fit in with Israel’s security provisions. There have been suggestions that some form of council could oversee such an economic zone, one in which Israeli representatives would be present. The council would have the latitude to determine who could enter the border zone and who could not. In other words, Israel would have a final say over which Lebanese are permitted to access sovereign Lebanese territory … Using the logic that they have applied in Syria and today in Gaza, the Israelis would try to impose a buffer zone north of the economic zone, in which they would limit the quantity and types of weaponry entering, along the lines of the 1949 Armistice Agreement …
All this is meaningless, however, if Israel fails to disarm Hezbollah, which is why the Israeli focus today may be on finding a way to do so. This is hardly as simple as it sounds. As my colleague Yezid Sayigh recently wrote: “Israel cannot ensure the full disarmament of Hezbollah, or its political suppression, alone.” He’s right. Ultimately, Israel will need the collaboration of the Lebanese armed forces to collect the group’s weapons. However, to reach such a stage, Israel will have to find a means of militarily debilitating Hezbollah, which is no easy task …
Israel has a host of political, military and perhaps even demographical ambitions in Lebanon, but in the end the key question will remain whether it has the means to carry them out … This could potentially lead to a situation similar to what happened after 1982, when Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and for a time dominated it completely. Yet the invasion provoked such chaos and inter-communal tensions, that by the end Israel had created a much greater problem than the Palestinian armed presence it had intervened to eliminate, namely arousing militancy within the Shiite community.
